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Configuring Authority over Electoral Manipulation in Electoral Authoritarian 
Regimes:  Evidence from Mexico 
 
Abstract:  How do electoral authoritarian autocrats choose strategies for manipulating 
elections?  Most scholars assume that autocrats strategize all electoral manipulation from 
above, with local regime agents charged with carrying out these top-down strategies.  In 
contrast, a few assume that local regime agents strategize all electoral manipulation from 
the bottom up.  More likely, reality lies in between.  To make this point, I build an 
argument for how autocrats might configure the distribution of decisions over electoral 
manipulation among regime agents.  I argue that autocrats delegate decisions about 
electoral manipulation to local regime agents in core regime districts – to ensure 
aggregate support – and to regime agents in recently marginal regime districts – to ensure 
territorial control.  In contrast, autocrats determine strategies in long-time marginal 
districts and in those turned adverse to the regime.  Statistical analysis of a unique 
political reform in one state in electoral authoritarian Mexico – where autocrats 
transferred the authority to restrict political rights and the secret ballot to some pro-regime 
agents but not to all – supports the argument.  It also reinforces the proposition that 
wholly centralized/decentralized decision-making about electoral manipulation only 
occurs under specific political conditions, undermining the empirical validity of these 
assumptions in current research.  
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How do electoral authoritarian autocrats choose strategies for manipulating 
elections?  The “menu of manipulation”1 includes a variety of technologies that can be 
used to bias election processes in their favour.2  Autocrats can legally manipulate formal 
electoral rules ahead of elections, such as district magnitudes and boundary lines, 
candidate selection and list placement, and campaign resource allocations.  They can also 
engage in a variety of informal and illegal practices, such as the discretional enforcement 
of formal electoral rules, candidate and voter intimidation, vote buying and voting fraud.3 
The variety of ways that autocrats can manipulate elections has led to a surge in 
studies examining why, how, and to what extent they do.  Most studies assume that 
autocrats rely on local regime agents to carry out electoral manipulation.4  However, the 
precise role that local regime agents play in determining strategies for electoral 
manipulation has been given little theoretical treatment.5  Recent theories about electoral 
manipulation have tended to adopt highly stylized views about the role of regime agents 
in it.  At one extreme, some scholars assume that autocrats strategize all electoral 
manipulation from the top down, with local regime agents merely carrying out these 
strategies on the ground.  They use this as a starting point for theorizing about how 
autocrats’ vary top-down strategies according to local political conditions.6  At the other 
extreme, some scholars assume that local regime agents take all decisions about electoral 
manipulation from the bottom up, with autocrats entirely delegating these decisions to 
them.  They use this as point of departure for examining how local regime agents’ 
decisions change with local political conditions.7   
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These two highly stylized views operate as simplifying assumptions allowing 
scholars to examine other questions.  However, the risk that poorly executed electoral 
manipulation will trigger anti-regime backlash8 suggests that autocrats may not take such 
extreme approaches.  The possibility that wholly bottom-up decision-making by local 
regime agents will result in the overproduction9 of electoral manipulation – raising the 
chance of its detection and therefor backlash against it – should lead autocrats to question 
the benefits of the wholly decentralized approach.  Efforts to avoid the overproduction of 
electoral manipulation may lead autocrats to consider wholly centralized decision-making 
but such top-down strategizing may prove inadequate for ensuring victory on the ground.  
Clumsy, last-minute central decisions to inflate aggregate vote totals are easily detected, 
something that should lead autocrats to rethink the benefits of the wholly centralized 
approach as well.  
The aim of this study is thus twofold.  I seek to provide evidence that wholly 
centralized and wholly decentralized characterizations of electoral manipulation are not 
the only choices available to autocrats but anchor two ends of a centralized-decentralized 
decision-making continuum.  I also seek to show that the local political conditions said to 
determine either autocrats’ or regime agents’ strategies for electoral manipulation are 
most likely driving autocrats’ decisions about how to distribute responsibility over 
electoral manipulation instead.  Observed variation in strategies for electoral manipulation 
may not result from autocrats’ or local regime agents’ choices but from variation in who 
enjoys this responsibility in the first place. 
To this end, I build an argument for how autocrats might distribute authority over 
electoral manipulation among local regime agents.  Joining research showing that 
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successful authoritarian rulers preserve aggregate regime support10 and territorial regime 
control,11 I argue that autocrats should follow a territorial-based political-distributional 
logic when determining the distribution of authority over electoral manipulation.  The 
need to ensure aggregate regime support should lead autocrats to transfer responsibility 
over electoral manipulation to regime agents in charge of core regime districts.  The need 
to ensure territorial control should lead autocrats to transfer this authority to regime agents 
in recently marginal regime districts as well.  Autocrats should retain authority over 
electoral manipulation in long-time marginal and adverse districts.  In other words, 
regional variation in patterns of regime support should lead autocrats to asymmetric 
approaches to the distribution of authority over electoral manipulation among regime 
agents, with wholly centralized or wholly decentralized strategies only occurring under 
specific political conditions. 
I provide preliminary support for the argument using data from electoral 
authoritarian Mexico.  Although scholars suggest that Mexico’s electoral authoritarian 
rulers often decentralized decision-making about electoral manipulation,12 no one has 
tested this proposition – or developed a general theory to explain why and how it occurred 
– due to the lack of reliable data on which regime agents (state governors, municipal 
mayors) enjoyed centralized and decentralized authority over electoral manipulation.  
However, autocrats in one state granted some municipal incumbents the authority to 
choose mechanisms for selecting incoming officials that could restrict political rights and 
force public ballots – two practices normally considered manipulative13 – but forced 
others to follow a common set of electoral rules that limited their the capacity to 
manipulate elections without state autocrats’ support.  This reform provides a rare 
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opportunity to observe autocrats’ decisions about the distribution of authority over 
electoral manipulation and to test arguments about it.  It also shows a case where 
decisions about electoral manipulation were not taken entirely from the top down or the 
bottom up, in contrast to what is sometimes assumed. 
 
Argument 
Most scholars take a territorial view of electoral authoritarian rule and describe 
vertically-structured authoritarian regimes as divided into localities administered by local 
regime agents.  Even so, most scholars note that autocrats seek to maximize aggregate 
regime support (the share of citizens supporting the regime in authoritarian elections) to 
legitimize their rule, strengthen regime loyalty, and deter regime defections.14  A few 
scholars note that autocrats must also preserve territorial control (maximize the number of 
districts under their control) to minimize opposition safe-havens from where opposition 
groups can mount challenges against the regime.15  Joining these insights, I argue that 
autocrats face a situation similar to that of democrats in mixed-member district electoral 
systems.  To survive, autocrats must target core districts for decentralized authority over 
electoral manipulation in the interest of maximizing aggregate support, while they must 
target marginal districts for decentralized authority over electoral manipulation in the 
interest of preserving territorial control. 
Research on democratic systems shows that party leaders facing large single 
nationwide or regional multi-member districts tend to target policy benefits, pork-barrel 
projects, campaign resources, and particularistic benefits among core voters that are easier 
to mobilize16 and cheaper to turnout.17  When party leaders must maximize aggregate 
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support in single nationwide or regional multi-member districts but administrative 
structures limit resource distribution to lower local-level districts, they will concentrate 
resources among core local-level districts.18  The loss of a partisan control over marginal 
local districts is inconsequential for maximizing aggregate support, so party leaders 
concentrate resources on core local districts where most voters are loyal and easier to 
mobilize.19  This same logic should guide autocrats concerned with maximizing aggregate 
regime support.  They should transfer authority over electoral manipulation to regime 
agents in core local districts where citizens are already loyal, and their support cheaper to 
mobilize and thus easier to inflate.  Regime agents in core districts count on extensive 
loyal populations, so their efforts to inflate regime support are unlikely to be 
controversial.  They also face weak opposition, so it is unlikely that manipulation will be 
noticed or result in anti-regime backlash if it is. 
The transfer of authority to regime agents in core local districts enjoys the 
additional advantage of triggering competition among them to develop the best locally-
tailored strategies for inflating regime support in precisely those localities most important 
for maximizing aggregate regime totals and that enjoy little chance of anti-regime 
backlash.  Regime agents enjoying decentralized authority will be driven to take 
advantage of their superior information to develop innovative technologies tailored to 
local political dynamics, similar to what occurs with policy and political decentralization 
in authoritarian nations.20  The decentralization of electoral manipulation should raise its 
incidence (overproduction), as each regime agent seeks to deliver the most inflated regime 
support.  The disadvantage of decentralized electoral manipulation lies in the inability of 
autocrats to rein in regime agents in response to unforeseen national political or economic 
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dynamics and opt for a more targeted or restrained approach – including clean elections – 
if considered best.  Autocrats should therefore be highly reluctant to decentralize electoral 
manipulation to all regime agents – unlike what is sometimes assumed – and only choose 
to do so under specific political conditions. 
Research on democratic systems also shows that party leaders who must maximize 
political representation through maximizing territorial control over single-member 
plurality districts will tend to concentrate policy and campaign resources in marginal local 
districts rather than core ones.21  I argue that this same logic should guide autocrats 
concerned with maximizing territorial control.  The loss of territory to opposition groups 
can provide them with a base from where to launch anti-regime activities and spread anti-
regime sentiment, leading to further territorial losses.  It can also undermine aggregate 
regime support by demonstrating the lack of regime legitimacy and by providing safe-
havens for defectors.  Because the loss of marginal local districts threatens territorial 
control, autocrats should take steps to allow regime agents to deploy their local expertise 
to bring their districts more firmly under regime rule.  As above, decentralization to 
agents in marginal districts provides the additional benefit that it triggers inter-agent 
competition to develop the most innovative strategies for manipulation.  
Yet, autocrats should not treat all marginal local districts equally.  The benefits of 
allowing regime agents to compete to deliver regime support are greater in some marginal 
districts, because some voters are easier to manipulate.  In recently marginal districts, it is 
easier to persuade recent regime defectors to return and therefore easier to inflate regime 
support without drawing undue opposition scepticism.  New opposition groups count on 
fewer resources and shallower support networks, and are less able to keep regime 
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defectors loyal, detect activities against them, and mount sustained anti-regime backlash if 
they do.  In contrast, regime agents in long-time marginal districts face stronger 
opposition groups, raising the difficulty of undertaking electoral manipulation against 
them.  Older opposition groups count on deeper networks of support and greater 
resources, and are more likely to ensure the loyalty of regime defectors, detect electoral 
manipulation against them, and engage in sustained anti-regime backlash if they do.  
Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and Nichter (2014) draw a similar distinction between voters with 
weaker and stronger partisan loyalties in machine-politics-based democratic systems.22 
The same logic holds for adverse local districts, where regime opposition is even 
deeper rooted and wider spread.  Autocrats should thus prefer to retain control over 
electoral manipulation conducted by regime agents in long-time marginal and adverse 
districts.  The advantage of centralized electoral manipulation lies in autocrats’ capacity to 
respond to unexpected political and economic dynamics.  The disadvantage lies in its loss 
in variety, innovation, and incidence.  It is the larger scope of autocrats’ territorial 
domains of responsibility and their greater distance from local dynamics that reduce their 
capacity to develop a wide variety of innovative strategies for manipulating support fine-
tuned to local contexts.  Although local regime agents in centralized systems will compete 
to demonstrate their value to autocrats, they must rely on a narrower set of technologies 
authorized by autocrats to this end.  Autocrats should thus be highly reluctant to wholly 
centralize electoral manipulation away from all regime agents – contrary to what is 
sometimes assumed – and only do this under specific political contexts. 
I thus expect: 
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H1: Autocrats will be more likely to decentralize electoral manipulation to regime agents 
in charge of local districts where regime support is higher, all else being equal. 
 
H2: Autocrats will be more likely to decentralize authority over electoral manipulation to 
regime agents in local districts where both regime support and recent declines in regime 
support are higher, all else being equal. 
 
If local regime support plays a role in the distribution of authority over electoral 
manipulation, then wholly centralized and wholly decentralized electoral manipulation 
would only occur under particular political conditions.  Autocrats would only wholly 
centralize decisions about electoral manipulation away from all regime agents if they face 
low regime support resulting from steady losses across all localities, an unlikely scenario 
as these regimes would be facing transition.  Autocrats would only wholly decentralize 
decisions about electoral manipulation to all regime agents if they enjoy strong regime 
support or face traditionally strong but sudden declines in support across all localities, a 
more plausible scenario but one not often assumed.   
I present the argument in terms of national-local dynamics but it should operate at 
all levels of vertically-structured authoritarian systems, such as between national leaders 
and regional (state) regime agents, regional (state) leaders and local (municipal) regime 
agents, and national leaders and local (municipal) regime agents.  Lower-level regime 
agents must deliver aggregate support and territorial control to their higher-level superiors 
if they are to rise within the system.  I assume that authority over electoral manipulation is 
finite, with any lower-level decentralization implying a loss of higher-level control.  I also 
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assume that lower-level regime agents enjoy similar levels of information and would be 
equally innovative in manipulating elections if allowed.  I assume that autocrats gather 
information about political and social dynamics informing their decisions from sources at 
all levels, although final decisions are taken by autocrats, not by regime agents.  Higher-
level autocrats enjoy authority over lower-level regime agents, not the reverse. 
 
Empirical Strategy 
The challenge with studying electoral manipulation is that it is usually 
unobservable as those engaging in it strive to keep it from view.  Some scholars rely on 
reports by aggrieved parties or election observers to identify manipulation.23  However, 
aggrieved parties have an incentive overstate it, while election observers may 
underestimate it as fraudulent activities shift locations in response to their presence.24  
Others examine voting results for suspicious patterns suggesting manipulation.25  
However, unsuspicious patterns can occur in dirty elections and suspicious ones in clean 
contests.26  To address these problems, scholars conduct field experiments27 and exploit 
natural ones.28  I take advantage of an unusual electoral reform in electoral authoritarian 
Mexico to identify centralized and decentralized authority over electoral manipulation.   
Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) managed the typical electoral 
authoritarian regime during the 20th century (until 2000), holding regular federal, state, 
and municipal elections.  PRI autocrats used formal electoral laws, like party registration 
rules, electoral formulas, and campaign resources, to bias results.29  They strategized 
candidate selection and the distribution of resources; selectively applied electoral laws; 
coerced candidates and voters; bought votes and stuffed ballot boxes.30  Some scholars 
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assume that electoral manipulation was strategized nationally from the top down31 but 
others suggest that national autocrats took a more flexible approach, noting that national 
autocrats allowed state governors autonomy to manage state political affairs, as long as 
they delivered PRI support and social stability.32  Governors “successful” in this regard 
were rewarded with fiscal transfers, capital investment, social spending,33 and promotions 
to federal or party posts.34  “Unsuccessful” governors controlled centrally or removed.35 
Although compelling, this description suffers from three problems.  First, scholars 
describing that national autocrats decentralized political authority to state governors do 
not develop a general theory to explain why or how this decentralization occurred.  
Second, they also do not provide evidence for their descriptive inferences: those showing 
that “unsuccessful” governors were removed from office neglect to demonstrate that those 
left in place were “successful” in delivering political support and social control.36  Those 
associating rises in fiscal transfers with the decentralization of authority over electoral 
manipulation fail to explain how PRI autocrats would have simultaneously used fiscal 
transfers to “punish” 37 “unsuccessful” regime agents without reducing their authority 
over electoral manipulation or how they would have used fiscal transfers to “reward” 38 
“successful” regime agents without granting them greater authority over manipulation.  
Finally, scholars tend to focus descriptions on national-state relations, often assuming that 
state governors enjoyed wholly centralized control over municipal mayors.  Yet, the same 
criteria leading higher-level autocrats to decentralize authority over electoral manipulation 
to lower-level regime agents may operate at all levels of the system. 
There is, however, a state in Mexico – Oaxaca, with a population over 3.8 million 
people – where autocrats undertook reforms that distributed authority over electoral 
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manipulation to some municipalities but not all, providing in a unique opportunity to test 
arguments about this decision-making process.  A firm PRI bastion, Oaxaca’s governors 
were handpicked by national PRI presidents to deliver PRI victories and social stability.39  
However, during the early 1990s, Oaxaca’s governors worried about the decline of state 
and municipal PRI support amidst increasingly disgruntled indigenous and peasant groups 
inspired by the 1994 armed Zapatista insurgency in neighbouring Chiapas, leading them 
to consider different approaches to ensuring support.40  In early 1995, state autocrats 
began to negotiate a state electoral reform that would divide Oaxaca’s 570 municipalities 
into those granted the authority to create local rules for selecting municipal officials – 
called “Usos y Costumbres” (UyC) or “Customary Law” systems – and those required to 
follow state electoral rules– called “Partidos Políticos” or “Political Parties” systems (PP).  
This division is still in place today. 
Conveniently for the purposes of this study, UyC system assignment delegated 
authority to incumbent municipal leaders to choose electoral rules considered 
manipulative by scholars of electoral malpractice.41  All UyC municipalities must follow 
the federal constitution and select a mayor, municipal councilmen (aldermen), and a 
community representative (ombudsman).  The selection of these authorities occurs during 
a general community assembly is run by a supervisory board composed of municipal 
incumbents who determine which rules will be used.  The board can restrict participation 
by sex, age, marital status, birth and residency requirements, and satisfactory participation 
in unpaid community service (called the tequio), thereby limiting the municipal 
“selectorate.”  The board can restrict the candidate pool by these same criteria and 
according to fulfilment of local unpaid community administrative positions (called 
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cargos).  The board selects the voting mechanism used by the assembly “selectorate,” and 
can create procedures ranging from the secret individual ballot to publicly cast votes in 
single or multiple rounds, with most choosing public ballots.  Municipal incumbents –
through their boards – can change assembly rules at will.  They also determine whether 
hamlets will share authorities with municipal seats, or whether they will select their own 
authorities.  Although Oaxaca’s community assemblies may appear a form of 
participatory governance, that supervisory boards can restrict political rights and secret 
ballots conflicts with this view.42  Such restrictions are contrary to the tenets of 
democratic participatory governance,43 with participatory rules failing to respect such 
rights undermining democracy.44  Instead, Oaxaca’s UyC rules are comparable to 
participatory institutions in authoritarian regimes.45 
Municipalities assigned PP systems were kept under central state control and 
required to follow state electoral rules that technically honoured universal political rights 
and the secret individual ballot (traditional liberal democratic norms).  State autocrats 
retained the authority to oversee and check any electoral manipulation in them.  This does 
not mean that municipal leaders did not engineer elections in PP systems or that state 
leaders did not encourage them in this regard; it means that state law did not decentralize 
the choice of technology to them.  State leaders retained authority to intervene in PP 
processes and deem them in contravention of state law, giving them direct oversight over 
regime agents.  State officials determined whether communities outside the municipal seat 
would share municipal leaders or select their own. 
The formal assignment of municipal UyC systems was negotiated in closed-door 
meetings between state governmental authorities, state electoral authorities, and 
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opposition party leaders.46  Most municipal leaders appear to have been unaware of 
negotiations,47 although some may have been consulted before determining assignment.  
Between the law’s legislative (rubberstamp) approval on 30 August 1995 and the 12 
November 1995 municipal elections, 410 municipalities were assigned UyC systems.  
This number rose to 412 in early 1996 and to 418 in 1997.48  Oaxaca’s remaining 
municipalities were codified as “Political Parties” systems.  Since 2012, there are 417 
UyC and 153 PP systems.  Map 1 presents the original 1995-96 distribution. 
– Map 1 – 
Oaxaca’s UyC reform is unusual but not exceptional.  Many state PRI autocrats 
allowed these systems informally,49 while those in the non-indigenous states of Puebla 
(1984) and Tlaxcala (1998) formalized UyC systems into law.  In Tlaxcala, sudden PRI 
losses in 1995 midterm state elections led state autocrats in 1998 to decentralize authority 
to municipal leaders to determine whether hamlet-level governments would use PP-style 
systems or UyC rules.  In Puebla, widespread PRI support led state autocrats in 1984 to 
decentralize authority to municipal leaders to organize hamlet-level elections, using of 
what they called “plebiscitary” systems with restricted political rights.  In contrast, in 
Chiapas, declining PRI support, amidst ongoing losses of territorial control to rebel and 
radicalized indigenous groups after the 1994 Zapatista rebellion, led state autocrats to 
undertake centralizing UyC measures to strengthen state political control.  Although these 
1999 measures recognized the use of UyC practices for selecting traditional leaders in 
“indigenous communities,” communities enjoyed no formal political-administrative status 
which left them dependent upon state authorities for recognition. 
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In Oaxaca, autocrats had long allowed municipal strongmen to engineer PRI 
municipal candidate lists informally using UyC practices.50  State autocrats would 
authorize the use of informal UyC practices when they thought municipal leaders would 
be able to use these systems to prevent the emergence of competing party lists or to 
guarantee PRI victory.  Those municipal leaders able to engineer an unopposed single PRI 
list then reported it as receiving 100% PRI support without holding formal elections.  
When opposition lists emerged, formal elections were held and the (often fraudulent) 
results reported to state authorities.  The PRI’s informal internal party UyC systems was 
supported by the state’s non-independent electoral institute that overlooked the failure to 
hold formal elections, made it difficult for opposition parties to register competing lists, 
and ignored complaints about electoral irregularities. 
However, in response to national legislation creating and strengthening an 
independent national electoral institute (1992-1994), Oaxaca’s state autocrats created 
(1992) and strengthened (1994) an independent state electoral institute.  This changed the 
context in which informal internal PRI UyC practices would operate.51  An independent 
state electoral institute could force municipal leaders to hold formal municipal elections, 
facilitate the registry of opposition party lists, and investigate electoral irregularities.  The 
formalization of municipal-level UyC systems could counteract these effects.  Municipal-
level UyC systems would authorize municipal incumbents to engineer a single list of 
candidates for the municipality and register it with state authorities as the new municipal 
administration, without holding formal elections.  (The 1995 reform allowed 
municipalities to register this slate under a party label but 1997 reforms prohibited this.)  
Municipal-level UyC systems would also allow municipal incumbents to use political 
 15 
practices – like restrictions on political rights and public ballots –  usually considered 
illegal by independent state electoral institutes.  Although the formal assignment of UyC 
systems reduced autocrats’ capacity to authorize/restrict municipal authority over 
electoral manipulation, they guaranteed the survival of practices that had been very useful 
for delivering PRI support.  
Even so, there is a debate about Oaxaca’s UyC reform.  Political opponents of the 
reform and numerous scholars have argued that the reform was the result of state PRI 
autocrats’ concerns about growing municipal turnover to opposition parties and losses of 
support among its traditional rural indigenous voters, often living on communal lands.52  
UyC reform was aimed at preventing additional opposition incursions.  By couching the 
reform as the recognition of indigenous and multicultural rights and participatory 
community rule, they hoped to shore up PRI support while dampening social unrest 
among radical indigenous and peasant organizations.  Interview evidence of the PRI’s 
political motives, that UyC assignment was determined by state political elites, and that 
highly indigenous municipalities received PP systems and non-indigenous ones UyC rules 
– shown in Table 1 – is used to support their case.53 
Yet, evidence that the PRI did not follow an indigenous or multicultural logic 
when assigning UyC systems does not confirm interview accounts that a political logic 
drove this reform instead.  Advocates and some scholars of UyC systems continue to 
assert that UyC reform was designed to promote indigenous and multicultural rights and 
participatory rule.  Citing individual cases, these scholars contend that UyC systems, 
through their community assemblies, strengthen municipal oversight, raise community 
political participation, and improve policy decisions,54 despite the fact that nearly all UyC 
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systems restrict political rights and secret ballots.55  Quantitative research showing that 
UyC systems raise abstention,56 winning margins, and PRI support57 are not convincing to 
advocates armed with evidence of successful cases. 
Until Oaxaca’s UyC assignment is adequately theorized and tested, individual 
cases where UyC systems improved local governance will be considered representative of 
the entire universe of UyC cases, rather than as outlying ones that should be examined for 
what makes them distinct.  The examination of Oaxaca not only tests the theory in this 
study about the political and social conditions leading autocrats to decentralize electoral 
manipulation, it also helps resolve this ongoing empirical debate.  If Oaxaca’s PRI 
autocrats worried about aggregate political support and territorial control, then they 
should have assigned decentralized UyC systems to municipalities with high PRI support 
(H1) and to municipalities with traditionally high PRI support that had faced recent 
dramatic declines (H2).  Because longer-term marginal and adverse districts, even if in 
PRI hands, would have been more difficult to engineer back to firmer PRI control, PRI 
autocrats should have assigned centralized PP systems to these places.  Empirical support 
for this rationale would dismiss the possibility of more altruistic multicultural motives. 
 
Statistical Results 
I evaluate support for the argument using logistic regression analysis.  The 
dichotomous dependent variable (UyC 1995) codes whether the municipality received 
decentralized UyC (1) or centralized PP systems (0) in the initial 1995-96 assignment.  I 
use the share of PRI support and changes to it in the 6 August 1995 state elections as the 
principal explanatory political variables.  The level of PRI support in these elections is 
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said to have played a deciding role in UyC assignment, given the proximity of the 12 
November 1995 municipal contests.58  I use election data from the 8 November 1992 
municipal elections to identify the 536 municipalities under PRI control and separate 
them from the 26 municipalities under opposition rule (data was missing for eight, four 
receiving UyC systems and four PP systems).59 
I test the argument on municipalities under PRI control.  Theoretically, the 
argument addresses autocrats’ decisions about how to distribute authority over electoral 
manipulation among localities with local regime agents, with the absence of regime 
agents placing them outside autocrats’ control.  Empirically, PRI officials are said to have 
allowed opposition leaders to take decisions about the few places under their rule.60  I 
return to the 26 municipalities under opposition control, as they provide additional 
support for the argument.  
The argument implies that state autocrats should be leery of decentralizing 
electoral manipulation to places known for opposition mobilization.  I thus include a 
variable that captures the presence of post-election conflicts during the 1989, 1992, and 
1995 state election processes (1 = yes, 0 = no) (Conflicts 1989; Conflicts 1992; Conflicts 
1995), capturing the capacity of groups to mount sustained rebellion.61 
I include controls for other factors sometimes said to have guided UyC 
assignment: the share of population living on communal lands (Communal Pop.) and in 
rural areas (Rural Pop.), an index of municipal migration (Migration) and poverty 
(Poverty Rate), the municipal population (Population), the share of population that is 
Catholic (Catholic Pop.) and indigenous (speakers over age five, Indigenous Pop.), and a 
measure of indigenous group concentration (the Herfindal-Hirschman index of market 
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concentration, Indig. Herf. Index).62  The Catholic Church voiced support for UyC 
systems.63  Municipal migration affects local political and social dynamics.64  Municipal 
population (Population) controls for the difficulty of using UyC in large urban areas.65  I 
return to the rural, communal, and indigenous population variables later.   
Poor rural indigenous peasant voters living on communal lands were traditional 
sources of PRI support,66 which could confound estimates of the effect of political support 
on UyC assignment.  I thus regressed 1992 and 1995 state PRI support on all socio-
demographic variables.  Figure 1 shows that only the poverty rate mattered for PRI 
support by the 1990s, but the low (0.10) correlation between these variables means that it 
did not affect the analysis.  A test for colinearity among all independent variables in the 
logistic regression models (below) shows that the mean Variation Inflation Index (VIF) 
was 1.48 (and none of the variables’ VIF above 2.08), with none of the variables’ 
Tolerance (T) levels falling below 0.52.  Descriptive statistics are in the appendix. 
– Figure 1 – 
Model 1 (Figure 2) examines the impact of regime support on UyC assignment 
among the 536 PRI-run municipalities.  Hypothesis 1 predicts that UyC adoption among 
PRI-led municipalities would be more likely where the state PRI was strongest, with 
Model 1 (Figure 2) showing that this was the case: the PRI Support 1995 coefficient is 
positive and significant.  Figure 3a graphs the predicted probability of UyC adoption 
estimated across all PRI-run municipalities.  The share of PRI support won in the August 
1995 state elections across PRI-run municipalities ran from 0.05 to 0.99 (mean 0.57, 
standard deviation 0.17), so I estimated predicted probabilities across the full range of 
1995 state PRI support.  Although there was a high chance of UyC adoption among all 
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PRI-led municipalities, municipalities with greater levels of state PRI support, that is, core 
PRI districts, were more likely to get UyC systems, as expected. 
– Figure 2– 
– Figure 3– 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that sudden strong declines in PRI support would raise the 
incentive for PRI autocrats to impose UyC systems.  The results for Model 1 (Figure 2) 
show that greater declines in PRI support were associated with greater chances of UyC 
adoption, with the coefficient for changing PRI support negative and significant.  The 
argument also suggests a more complex interaction between the level of PRI support and 
changes to it capturing the difference between recent and long-time marginal status.  
Marginal districts experiencing larger recent declines in support (making them recently 
marginal) would be more likely to receive UyC rules than districts equally marginal but 
having experienced smaller recent declines in support (making them longer-term 
marginal).  Data restrictions lead me to measure recent and long-time marginality in this 
way; state electoral data by municipality is not available for Oaxaca prior to 1992.  
Figure 3b assesses the interaction between PRI support and changes to it using 
estimations of the predicted probabilities of UyC adoption across all levels but fixed 
changes in PRI support, holding all covariates at their means.  The figure shows the 
impact of PRI support in two types of municipalities: one with declines in support one 
standard deviation (-0.18) below the mean loss (-0.21) [with a -0.40 decline in PRI 
support] and one with declines in support one standard deviation above (+0.18) the mean 
loss (-0.21) [at basically no change in PRI support (0.00)].  I graph levels of PRI support 
from 0 to 0.60 (anything above cannot accommodate a -0.40 loss).  Marginal 
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municipalities, say, with PRI support around a 0.50 share, facing a large recent loss in 
support, were more likely to be assigned UyC than municipalities that were already 
marginal (facing no recent loss) at the time of the 1995 state election. 
Figure 3b also reveals something unexpected: PRI autocrats also delegated UyC 
rules to recently adverse districts.  The probability of UyC adoption among municipalities 
facing larger declines in PRI support grows at lower levels of PRI support, while the 
chance of UyC adoption declines at lower levels of PRI support among municipalities 
facing no changes in PRI support.  This suggests that the expected benefit of 
decentralizing power to local regime agents facing newer and less established opposition 
groups is high in both recently marginal and recently adverse districts. 
The argument implies that Oaxaca’s PRI officials should have been reluctant to 
assign UyC systems to municipalities where voters had a history of unrest.  Figure 4 
shows that post-election conflicts in 1989 (Conflicts 1989) and 1992 (Conflicts 1992) both 
had a negative and significant effect on the chances of UyC assignment among PRI-run 
municipalities.  Post-election conflicts in 1995 had no effect, probably because they were 
still playing out through the 12 November 1995 municipal elections.  Figure 4a graphs the 
estimated effect of 1992 conflicts across all municipalities at different levels of PRI 
support (holding covariates at their means).  Figure 4b graphs the effect of post-election 
conflicts across different levels of and changes in PRI support (as above) to show that the 
impact of conflict was negative and strong across the board.   




Evidence that national PRI autocrats bypassed state regime agents to make UyC 
assignments would undermine the argument that Oaxaca’s state autocrats enjoyed 
decentralized political authority to approve the 1995 UyC reform in the first place.  If the 
argument here is correct, there should be no evidence that national regime support 
mattered during distributional decisions.  Model 2 (Figure 5) shows that federal elections 
played no role in UyC assignment; variables for PRI support in the 1994 federal 
congressional elections (Federal PRI 1994) and changes to it (Chg. Federal PRI 1991-94) 
were not significant.67 
–Figure 5– 
Evidence that opposition leaders asserted authority over regime agents in long-
time marginal and adverse districts, despite these places being in PRI hands, would 
undermine the argument that PRI autocrats made decisions about the decentralization of 
political manipulation among regime agents across districts under their control, raising 
concerns that the argument is not correct.  I thus re-ran the analysis in Model 1 (Figure 2) 
on the full sample of both PRI-run and opposition-run municipalities using a dummy 
variable and its interaction to distinguish whether the municipality was opposition-run 
(Opposition Wins 1992) (yes = 1, no = 0).  Model 3 (Figure 6) present the results.  If 
opposition party leaders had determined UyC assignment in both opposition-run and PRI-
run long-time marginal and adverse districts, then they would have prioritized these 
systems where PRI support was weak and conflictive in both types of places, which was 
not the case.  Figure 7a shows that falling PRI support in opposition-run municipalities 
raised the chance of UyC adoption, while falling PRI support in PRI-run municipalities 
lowered it (holding change in PRI support at 0 to reflect a long-time marginal district and 
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other covariates at means).  Figure 7b also shows that conflicts had the opposite effect in 
opposition-led and PRI-run places.  These findings are consistent with the conclusion that 
opposition leaders took decisions in localities under their control and PRI autocrats took 
decisions in localities under theirs. 
– Figure 6 – 
– Figure 7 – 
Empirical findings that a political logic drove UyC assignment helps dismiss a 
multicultural indigenous or participatory logic.  Even so, the variables for indigenous 
population (Indigenous Pop.) and communal lands population (Communal Pop.) were 
positive and significant, requiring discussion.  Advocates of UyC systems argue that these 
populations enjoyed pre-existing UyC institutions and thus merited UyC assignment.  
Rather than providing support for this contention, however, the results provide evidence 
in favour of the PRI’s territorial based political-distributional logic.  Under the 
multicultural or participatory logic, unified indigenous groups – with better access to 
indigenous group organizational elites – should have been more likely to cooperate on 
informal UyC systems and better able to demand and receive UyC assignment.  However, 
the variable capturing the level of indigenous population concentration in a single group 
(Indig. Herf. Index), defined above, was not significant (Model 1, Figure 2).   
Given empirical support for the territorially-based political-distributional logic, the 
positive and significant effect of the indigenous (Indigenous Pop.) and communal lands 
(Communal Pop.) population variables on UyC assignment reflect state autocrats’ view 
that these traditional PRI voters – alongside rural ones (Rural Pop.) – would be easily 
engineered back to the PRI under UyC rules.  Demands for multicultural rights and 
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participatory rule could have been addressed met by state leaders through the 
prioritization of UyC systems among organized indigenous and peasant populations, but 
this was not the case.  Only an authoritarian regime aimed at political survival would have 
decentralized the authority to restrict political rights and the secret ballot according to 
political considerations, in the face of organized indigenous and peasant groups 
demanding UyC systems. 
The political exigencies of strengthening aggregate regime support and territorial 
regime control thus led state autocrats in Oaxaca to transfer authority over electoral 
manipulation to regime agents in core and recently marginal districts.  State autocrats also 
decentralized electoral manipulation to regime agents in recently adverse districts, an 
unexpected result but one that is consistent with the logic that autocrats consider the ease 
through which new opposition voters can be manipulated back to the regime.  State 
autocrats were unlikely to decentralize control to regime agents in long-time marginal 
districts and long-time adverse ones.   
UyC municipalities initially delivered stronger support to the PRI compared to PP 
systems,68 helping Oaxaca’s state autocrats survive another ten years beyond 2000 
national democratization – in what scholars of Latin American politics have identified as 
a subnational electoral authoritarian regime,69 also known to exist outside Latin America 
as well70 – demonstrating their approach was fairly effective.  However, as noted, the 
1995 formal UyC assignment meant that the authority over electoral manipulation that 
came with it could not be recentralized without formal legislation.  As long as state 
autocrats retained discretion over fiscal transfers to municipal governments, their goals 
carried considerable sway, both prior to and immediately after the 1995 UyC reform.  
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However, national fiscal reforms in 1997 reduced the capacity of state autocrats to 
withhold resources from municipal governments, reducing the capacity of state autocrats 
to pressure UyC leaders to use these systems on behalf of the PRI.  As a result, many 
began to deliver votes to PRI defectors, electing one state governor in 2010. 
 
Conclusion 
One of the original aims of this study was to focus attention on the empirical 
validity of two extreme assumptions sometimes made about the structure of electoral 
manipulation in electoral authoritarian regimes.  Some scholars assume that autocrats take 
all decisions about electoral manipulation and local regime agents carry them out.  In 
contrast, some scholars assume that autocrats decentralize all decisions to local regime 
agents.  Taking either of these views, scholars then argue that variation in local political 
conditions explain variation in either autocrats’ or regime agents’ strategies for electoral 
manipulation across localities in these regimes.  However, these two stylized 
characterizations represent two extreme ends of a centralized-decentralized decision-
making continuum, with autocrats enjoying other options. 
To support this possibility, I develop an argument for how autocrats configure the 
distribution of authority over electoral manipulation across local regime agents.  I argue 
that autocrats transfer authority over electoral manipulation to regime agents in core 
regime districts – out of concern for aggregate regime support – and to regime agents in 
recently marginal districts – out of concern for territorial regime control.  Autocrats 
determine strategies themselves in long-time marginal and adverse districts.  The 
argument implies that autocrats would only wholly centralize or wholly decentralize 
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decisions from/to regime agents under very particular political conditions, and that most 
situations would call for an asymmetric approach. 
In making this argument, I seek to show that scholars taking extreme views about 
the decision-making structure of electoral manipulation should justify them empirically.  
Otherwise, the evidence provided to support their arguments about the impact of local 
political conditions on autocrats’ top-down or regime agents’ bottom-up strategies for 
electoral manipulation, said to be taken for all districts in the regime, may be capturing 
the alternative logic outlined here: that local political conditions affect strategies for 
electoral manipulation by affecting autocrats’ choices about where to centralize and where 
to decentralize decision-making about it in the first place.  As such, any observed 
variation in strategies for electoral manipulation would in fact reflect variation in whether 
these decisions were retained by autocrats from the top down or delegated to regime 
agents from the bottom up in an asymmetric way. 
I provide preliminary support for the argument – and the electoral manipulation 
decision-making continuum – using an unusual reform in electoral authoritarian Mexico.  
Only examination of other regimes can confirm whether autocrats vary the configuration 
of decision-making about electoral manipulation in the way argued here.  Yet, there are 
reasons to think this may be the case.  Authoritarian,71 electoral authoritarian,72 and 
dominant party73 leaders are known to distribute other (economic) resources 
asymmetrically among regime agents based on regime support, so they may distribute 
authority over electoral manipulation asymmetrically as well.  Autocrats in Africa,74 
Central Asia,75 and the Middle East76 are known to rely on unelected traditional leaders 
(chieftains, warlords, strongmen, notables, or priests) to manage local politics, with this 
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Table 1: Indigenous Population and UyC Assignment 
Indigenous Population 
Share 
UyC Systems PP Systems 
0.75 to 1.0 157 30 
0.50 to 0.74 47 11 
0.25 - 0.49 36 28 
0 to 0.24 172 89 








































Map 1:  The Distribution of UyC and PP Systems in Oaxaca, Mexico 
 




Appendix: Descriptive Statistics for PRI-Controlled and Opposition-Run Municipalities 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
      
PRI-Controlled Municipalities 536     
UyC Systems 403     
PP Systems 133     
Conflicts 1989 37     
Conflicts 1992 64     
Conflicts 1995 95     
State PRI Support 1995 535 0.57 0.18 0.06 0.99 
Change PRI Supp. 1992-95 535 -0.21 0.18 -0.88 0.53 
Indigenous Population 536 0.44 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Indigenous Concentration 536 0.78 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Poverty Index 536 0.63 0.82 -1.73 2.64 
Catholic Population 536 0.88 0.11 0.31 1.00 
Communal Lands Population 536 0.20 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Rural Population 536 0.87 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Migration Index 536 -0.08 0.95 -0.88 6.40 
Population 536 5027.13 11882.35 149.00 213985.00 
      
Opposition-Run Municipalities 26     
UyC Systems 5     
PP Systems 21     
Conflicts 1989 9     
Conflicts 1992 9     
Conflicts 1995 9     
State PRI Support 1995 26 0.47 0.14 0.21 0.87 
Change PRI Supp. 1992-95 26 -0.08 0.15 -0.49 0.23 
Indigenous Population 26 0.39 0.38 0.00 0.98 
Indigenous Concentration 26 0.77 0.26 0.25 1.00 
Poverty Index 26 0.40 0.97 -1.66 1.97 
Catholic Population 26 0.89 0.08 0.71 0.99 
Communal Lands Population 26 0.12 0.09 0.00 0.28 
Rural Population 26 0.59 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Migration Index 26 -0.14 0.92 -0.88 2.48 
Population 26 10958.62 18116.36 1076.00 66414.00 
      
Municipalities with Missing 
Election Data 8     
UyC Systems 4     
PP Systems 4     
      
Total Municipalities 570     
UyC Systems 412     
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